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An implied ground for refusal to enforce iMSAs under the Singapore Convention on Mediation: the 
effect of Article 6? 
 
Shou Yu Chong, Nadja Alexander (Editor), Singapore International Dispute Resolution Academy, February 17, 
2019 
 
This post is part of a series on the UN Convention on Mediated Settlement Agreements Resulting from 
Mediation (the Singapore Convention on Mediation). In previous posts we have outlined the 
conventional view that Article 5 of the Singapore Convention establishes exhaustively all the possible 
exceptions to the enforcement of iMSAs that have otherwise have complied with the requirements 
set out under Article 4. In this post we question this initial position and ask whether there is an implied 
ground for refusal to enforce iMSAs under the Singapore Convention made available through an 
application of Article 6.  
 
First let’s recall the grounds for refusal of iMSAs found in the Singapore Convention.  
The grounds for refusal may be grouped into four main categories: 
1. Contract-like defences (Article 5(1) (a)—(d)) 
2. Mediator-misconduct defences (Article 5(1) (e)—(f)) 
3. Subject matter not capable of settlement by mediation (Article 5(2) (b)) 
4. Public policy (Article 5(2) (a)). 
 
Now, let’s consider the following situation. You may recall the hypothetical case of Mia and Maha 
from a previous post. Let’s continue the hypothetical by assuming that Germany and Australia have 
ratified the Singapore Convention without declaring any reservations (Article 8). Imagine that Mia 
(whom you may recall runs a graphic design sole proprietorship in Germany) and Maha Pty Ltd 
(‘Maha’, a company registered in New South Wales, Australia) have agreed through an iMSA to settle 
a breach of contract issue involving rights to an IP licence after a marathon 20-hour mediation session. 
The parties also agreed in express terms that the Singapore Convention on Mediation would apply to 
the enforcement of their iMSA, although this would appear not to have been necessary –strictly 
speaking. 
 
The representative of Maha at mediation, Maximus, was empowered by the board of Maha to offer a 
settlement of a sum of money below AUD $1 million. Unfortunately, Maximus, who left his eyeglasses 
on the flight en route to the mediation, misread the instructions from Maha, and offered Mia a 
settlement sum of AUD $5 million, believing by mistake that he was empowered to arrive at a 
settlement sum below AUD $10 million. Mia agrees to the offer and both parties sign an iMSA to 
conclude the mediation. Immediately after, Maximus retires, closes his legal practice and disappears 
into the Caribbean Islands, never to be heard from again. The directors of Maha realise too late that 
the settlement sum they had offered to pay via Maximus was in excess of the authorised AUD $1 
million. Mia takes the iMSA to Germany and New South Wales for enforcement. However, Maha 
applies to challenge the enforceability of the iMSA in both jurisdictions on grounds that its 
representative, Maximus, had no authority to offer the agreed sum of money in the settlement (Article 
5(1)). 
 
Now, where a party seeks to challenge the enforceability of an iMSA in one jurisdiction (e.g., 
Germany), the courts of the other signatory States (e.g., Australia) may, according to Article 6, adjourn 
enforcement proceedings in their jurisdiction. Let’s assume that the court in New South Wales does 
adjourn the proceedings before it …   
 
This type of situation is envisaged by Article 6 of the Singapore Convention, which specifically 
addresses parallel enforcement proceedings: “If an application or a claim relating to a settlement 
agreement has been made to a court, an arbitral tribunal or any other competent authority which may 
affect the relief being sought under article 4, the competent authority of the Party to the Convention 
where such relief is sought may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decision and may also, on the 
request of a party, order the other party to give suitable security.”  
 
So article 6 expressly refers to adjournment and security. The actual decision whether to adjourn or 
to proceed with the hearing will be governed by private international law rules and the procedural 
rules of the receiving court.   Yet the practical effect of Article 6 (beyond adjournment and/or security) 
is not clear from a plain reading of its terms. We need to think about what an adjourning court may 
do, should a challenge lodged in another jurisdiction succeed, for example should Maha’s defence 
based on Article 5(1) succeed with the result that the iMSA is declared unenforceable.  
 
We could look to Article VI of the New York Convention for guidance: it is similarly worded and was 
the basis for Article 6 of the Singapore Convention. Article VI of the New York Convention facilitates 
the application of Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, which stipulates that a court may refuse 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award if it “has not yet become binding on the 
parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country”. In other words 
if Mia and Maha were dealing with an arbitral award, Maha will first apply to set aside the arbitral 
award at the seat of the arbitration, before proceeding to the jurisdictions where Mia has applied to 
enforce the award (i.e., New South Wales and Germany) to apply for an adjournment of enforcement 
proceedings. If the setting aside application in the courts at the seat is successful, the adjourning 
courts would refuse to recognise or enforce the foreign arbitral award on the basis of Article V(1)(e). 
 
Unlike the New York Convention, the Singapore Convention does not make provisions for what the 
court may do once a challenge to the enforcement of an iMSA in a parallel proceeding succeeds. 
 
So the interesting question becomes: can we read Article 6 in a way that creates an implied ground 
for refusal of enforcement of iMSAs outside the scope of Article 5? Effectively this would be an implied 
defence founded upon fact that the iMSA sought to be enforced has already been refused 
enforcement by the courts of another signatory State.  
 
Such an implied defence would need to be restricted to iMSAs that have been refused enforcement 
because of succeeding defences which stem from private law vitiating factors (e.g., incapacity of 
parties, terms which are null and void, inoperative and incapable of performance etc.) and mediator 
misconduct.  
 
It should be emphasised that the proposed implied defence would not apply to iMSAs refused 
enforcement on public policy grounds or because its subject matter may not be susceptible to 
mediation. This is because the legal test administered to adjudicate whether these grounds for refusal 
are available are likely to be peculiar to the domestic laws in each signatory State. It may be possible 
for an iMSA to be enforceable in one State, but for the courts of another to refuse enforcement on 
public policy grounds. 
 
In summary therefore, an implied ground for refusal of enforcement could be read into Article 6 of 
the Singapore Convention. This may be buttressed upon trite private international law principles of 
recognition of foreign judgments (i.e., particularly of a court judgment that determines finally and 
conclusively if an iMSA may be refused enforcement in that jurisdiction). Referring to the illustration 
of the dispute between Mia and Maha above, when Mia proceeds to enforce the iMSA in Germany 
and New South Wales, Maha may choose to first submit an Article 5 defence in either the German or 
New South Wales court, according to whichever jurisdiction it is advised by its lawyers to better yield 
a successful defence. If it chooses to first submit an Article 5 defence in Germany, Maha would then 
subsequently apply for the enforcement application to be adjourned in New South Wales. Should an 
implied ground for refusal of enforcement could be read into Article 6 of the Singapore Convention, it 
is possible that the adjourning New South Wales court would be required to recognise the German 
State court’s judgment ruling on the issue i.e. that the iMSA is not enforceable on the basis of a 
successful Article 5(1) defence.  Although in some jurisdictions (e.g Thailand and Indonesia), courts do 
not recognise foreign court judgments and require parties to sue afresh in relation to the discrete 
issues adjudged under their private international law, it is certainly arguable that the courts of 
signatory States to the Singapore Convention are – nonetheless – bound by their Convention 
obligations to recognise a particular judgment of the court which first determines if an iMSA may be 
refused enforcement.  
 
We invite comments and discussion on the ideas presented in this posting on the possibility of an 
implied ground of refusal in Article 6 of the Singapore Convention. 
 
 
 
 
 
